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NOTES
IT'S NOT A CULTURAL THING: DISPARATE DOMESTIC
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
STANDARDS - A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND
EGYPT
INTRODUCTION
THE OBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW is the promotion of world order
through the maintenance of peace and justice. Human rights law directly
promotes the well-being and just treatment of individuals who comprise
the world order. An internationalist's concern with achieving the goals of
international law leads to an examination of certain human rights stan-
dards on criminal justice, the area where many violations of individual
civil rights occur. This Note focuses on the pre-trial detention phase of
the criminal procedure system as most violations of human rights which
are basic to our human dignity occur during arbitrary and incommunicado
detentions. Unchecked police control of this phase leads to violations of
such basic human rights as freedom from torture, and thus compromises
the integrity of a system which relies on its ability to promote justice.
Egregious violations of human rights law on criminal procedure since the
United Nations General Assembly (G.A.) adopted the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights in 1948,' occurring mostly in the non-Western2
world, prompt a re-examination of these international standards. These
violations raise the obvious question: what are the reasons for the viola-
tions and for the existing disparity in adherence to the international norms
between the West and the non-West?
The most common answer to the above question rejects international
human rights law as exclusively Western and thus inapplicable outside the
Western nations. Human rights scholars and practitioners are asking
U.N GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948), reprinted in U.N. DEPT.
OF PUB. INFO., UNiVERSAL DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS, U.N. Sales No. 1949.1.3
(1950) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
2 "The West" refers to the industrialized nations of Western Europe and North
America, and the 'non-West' to the developing nations, as well as Japan.
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whether the violations are due to the fact that non-Westem states cannot
adhere to the standards because of cultural differences and different legal
systems This position has been encouraged by governments accused of
violations, as it justifies and indeed excuses their violations.4 This Note
advances the argument that the disparity in enforcement may be attributed
to the difference in legal systems between many Western countries and
non-Western countries. Part I briefly describes the governing international
human rights standards on pre-trial detention, including the doctrine of
derogability under a state of emergency. Part II analyzes the most com-
mon answer to the issue raised, which is referred to as the cultural
relativist position on human rights. The analysis entails evaluating the
universality of the standards, and critiquing the cultural relativist view of
international human rights. This part concludes that the human rights
standards on criminal procedure are universal. Part Im compares the legal
system and criminal procedures of the United States, a Western state that
is held up as a model of enforcement of the criminal procedure standards,
with those of Egypt, a non-Western state consistently accused of gross
violations of the standards.' Instead of resorting to a cultural relativist
explanation of the disparity in the application of human rights law, Part
I shows that the violations may be due to institutional factors such as
' This is a cultural relativist argument which advocates formulating human rights
within a cultural context. For a full explanation and critique of cultural relativity in
human rights, see Fernando R. T6son, International Human Rights and Cultural
Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 42 (Richard P. Claude &
Bums H. Eston eds., 2d ed. 1992). For a cultural relativist argument, see Richard Falk,
Cultural Foundations for the International Protection of Human Rights, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERsPECTIvES 44, 57-58 (Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im ed.,
1992).
4 Ann E. Mayer, Universal Versus Islamic Human Rights: A Clash of Cultures or
a Clash with a Construct? 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 307, 308 (1994); see also T~son,
supra note 3.
' The United States and Egypt are representative of each category since 1) the ma-
jor international instruments comprising the treaty law on human rights were arguably
inspired in part by the U.S. Constitution, notably its Bill of Rights (the reference in
scholarship to the "international Bill of Rights" and the similarity of the language of
the instruments with that of the Bill of Rights is a reflection of that fact); and 2)
Egypt has one of the oldest penal codes in the Arab world, which has served as a
model for other Arab states in the development of their own legal systems. See
MAHMOUD M. MUSTAFA, PRINCIPES DE DROIT PENAL DES PAYS ARABES [Principles of
Penal Law of Arab Countries] 12, 15 (1972), and Egypt's human rights record has
been the focus of consistent attacks from international human rights watchdogs. See,
e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL U.S.A., EGYPT: TEN YEARS OF TORTURE (1991)
(documenting human rights violations carried out by the Egyptian authorities) [hereinaf-
ter TEN YEARS OF TORTURE].
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the misallocation of power in the legal system and the professional
training of the system's personnel, as well as a lack of resources, the
under-development of legal civics, and internal threats to state security.
Specific documented instances of violations in each country underline the
argument that a misallocation of power in a legal system may explain
abuses of state power and the resulting violations of human rights. The
Conclusion proposes some solutions to closing the gap between human
rights observance by mere enactment of domestic law, and more signifi-
cant human rights observance by the actual enforcement of the domestic
law.6
PART I: HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS
A. Overview of the Human Rights Standards on Criminal Procedure
This argument starts with a discussion of the basic human rights law
governing criminal procedure standards with respect to pre-trial detention.
The Universal Declaration, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in
1948,' first expressed the world's recognition that minimum uniform
standards of criminal procedure should be enacted to safeguard all
peoples' rights to human dignity.8 Although the Universal Declaration has
no legally binding effect, it is nevertheless an authoritative expression of
the world's view of the most basic individual rights and general princi-
ples of law.' At the time of adoption, supporters viewed it as the founda-
6 The lack of meaningful and relevant sources on the Egyptian legal system and
this particular issue might explain the popularity of the cultural relativist position in the
international human rights debate. As a result of the lack of source material, the
assumptions on which some of this Note's conclusions are drawn might be vulnerable
to attack. The lack of documented support, however, does not invalidate this study or
its proposals and conclusions. Part of the solution to this problem is an increased
understanding by Western scholars, decision-makers, and opinion leaders of the multi-
dimensional facets of a non-Western state's failure to enforce human rights, marked by
a more sophisticated debate about the application and enforcement of human rights
outside the West. The conclusions of this Note introduce new issues and questions to
the debate which should contribute to a more comprehensive and intellectually coherent
debate about international human rights in the non-Western world.
' Universal Declaration, supra note 1; THE UNIvERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1992). The Declaration was adopted
by 48 countries, with eight abstentions (by Byelorussian S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland,
Saudi Arabia, Ukranian S.S.R., Union of South Africa, U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia) and
no opposition. Both the United States and Egypt voted in favor of the Declaration.
1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 535, U.N. Sales No. 1950.1.11.
' See 1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 535, U.N. Sales No. 1950.1.11 (statement by the President
of the General Assembly).
' Antonio Cassese, The General Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-1989, in
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
tion for the subsequent international conventions on human rights that
created legal obligations on their signatories." Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration prohibits torture or "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment,"" and Article 9 prohibits, inter alia, arbitrary arrest and
detention.'2
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR or
Covenant), which was adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 and
entered into force in 1976," and ratified by both the United States
(1992)'" and Egypt (1982), is a binding agreement on its signatories.
The Covenant is an effort to codify the general principles expressed in
the Universal Declaration'5 and the customary law.' 6 In that vein, the
ICCPR provides mechanisms for the enforcement of the protected rights
by establishing the Human Rights Committee, which has the authority to
hear complaints by one state party against another state party for viola-
tions of the ICCPR. 7 The Covenant also requires parties to provide
THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 31 (Philip Alston
ed., 1992).
to See 1948-49 U.N.Y.B. 535, U.N. Sales No. 1950.1.11 (statement by the President
of the General Assembly). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Convention Against Torture are discussed infra part I.
" Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at art. 5.
12 Id. at art. 9.
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force on March 23, 1976); see also Status of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Human Rights, 1976 U.N.Y.B. 609, U.N. Sales No. E.78.I.1
(presenting the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) [hereinafter Status
of Covenant on Human Rights]
14 Treaty Actions, 5 DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 28, July 11, 1994 [hereinafter Treaty
Actions].
S John Quigley, Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United States
Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 59 (1993).
,6 The customary law is reflected in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987). The Restatement is regarded as
persuasive authority of the general principles of law governing in the U.S. §702 on the
customary international law of human rights states:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, encourages,
or condones...
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention.
According to the Comments to this section, prohibited acts rise to the level of "state
policy" when: "such acts, especially by its officials, have been repeated or notorious
and no steps have been taken to prevent them or punish the perpetrators." Id.
,' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at art. 2.
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remedies in their domestic legislation for violations of their obligations
under the ICCPR.'8 Article 7 of the ICCPR proscribes, inter alia, torture
and other cruel and inhuman treatment,'9 while Article 9 proscribes
arbitrary arrest and detention, requires prompt adjudication of criminal
charges," and creates an "enforceable right to compensation" for victims
of unlawful arrests or detentions.2 ' Article 10 further provides that im-
prisoned or detained persons "shall be treated with humanity and with re-
spect to the inherent dignity of the human person."' Article 14 restates
the right of a suspect to be informed promptly of the charge against him,
to be tried without undue delay, and most significantly, to be informed of
his right to legal counsel.' Finally, Article 17 prohibits arbitrary or
unlawful interference with privacy, family, or home.24
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which was adopted by the U.N.
General Assembly on December 10, 1984, and entered into force on June
26, 1987 (the Convention Against Torture),' is an attempt to "make
more effective the struggle against torture ... throughout the world."26
Egypt acceded to the Convention in 1986.27 The United States signed the
Convention in 1988,' but the Senate had yet to ratify it as of July 1994
due to a series of reservations submitted to it with the treaty.
" Id. at art. 2. Art. 2(3) provides:
[e]ach State Party . .. undertakes: (a) [t]o ensure that any person whose rights or free-
doms as herein recognized are violated shall have effective remedy, notwithstanding that
the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) [t]o en-
sure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities.
' Id. at art. 7.
20 Id. at art. 9.
21 Id.
22 Id. at art. 10.
2 Id. at art. 14.
24 Id. at art. 17.
' Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, December 10, 1984, reprinted in J. Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius,
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVEN-
TION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT (1988) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
26 Id. at 177 (pmbl).
2 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: TORTURE AND DETENTION IN
EGYPT 11 (1992).
28 U.S. Signs U.N. Convention Against Torture, DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug., 1988, at 79.
29 Treaty Actions, supra note 14; See 136 CONG. REC. S18,278 (1990); 138 CONG.
REC. E3214 (1992).
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The Convention Against Torture defines torture as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from
him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an
act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquies-
cence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity
[emphasis added].3"
The Convention Against Torture obligates the parties to enact domestic
legislation making torture a criminal offense (article 4)31 and sets out in
more detail than the ICCPR the obligations of parties to prosecute torture
crimes.32 Article 10 dictates that parties:
[E]nsure that education and information regarding the prohibition against
torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel,
civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons
who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any
individual subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment.33
The Convention Against Torture also requires that victims have legal
remedies under domestic legislation.34 The Convention creates enforce-
ment mechanisms similar to those in the Covenant by setting up the
Committee against Torture that has similar functions and authority with
respect to state party violations as does the Human Rights Committee
created by the Covenant.35
B. Interpretation of Human Rights Law by the Human Rights Committee
An exposition of the governing international standards on human
rights would be incomplete without a discussion of the interpretation of
these standards by the relevant international body. Article 28 of the
ICCPR established the Human Rights Committee as a permanent and
independent human rights body to implement the ICCPR.36 The Commit-
Convention Against Torture art. 1, supra note 25, at 177.
Id. at 178 (art. 4).
32 Id. at 178-81 (arts. 4-16).
33 Id. at 180 (art. 10).
" Id. at 181 (art. 14).
35 Id. at 182-87 (arts. 17-24).
' International Covenant Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at art. 28.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STANDARDS
tee was created when Article 28 entered into force on September 20,
1976."7 The Committee is charged with reviewing the human rights
situation in each signatory state and monitoring the adherence to the
standards of the ICCPR" The Committee is comprised of eighteen
independent experts,39 elected for a term of four years at a meeting of
state parties every two years. Members are elected on the basis of
geographical representation with three members each from Africa, Asia,
Latin America, and Eastern Europe; and six members from Western
Europe and other geographical groups. The Committee meets three times
a year for three weeks.' The ICCPR entrusts the Committee with three
main functions: 1) study the mandatory national reports submitted by the
State parties on the measures they have taken to implement the ICCPR;4'
2) review of one State party's complaint against another for violations of
the Covenant and attempt to reach a "friendly solution of the matter;"'42
and 3) under Article 5 of the Optional Protocol to the Covenant, review
an individual complaint against a State party.43
The role of the Committee is limited to establishing facts presented
to it by the State parties and complaining individuals subject to the
jurisdiction of a State party. The Committee relies on the State parties'
moral obligations to enforce the decisions of the Committee, and has
neither legal power nor authority to enforce any decision against a State
party.' Members of the Committee have characterized the Committee as
a judicial body, while others consider the Committee to be a supervisory
body.45 It is clear, however, that although the Committee does not for-
mally hand down judgments, its functions, such as reviewing annual
reports and individual complaints of abuses, establishing facts and ren-
dering comments, amount to quasi-judicial, as well as supervisory, func-
tions.
PAUL R. WILLIAMS, TREATMENT OF DETAINEES: EXAMINATION OF ISSUES RELE-
VANT TO DETENTION BY THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE 3 (1990).
3 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at art. 40.
3' Article 28 provides that Committee members should have "recognized competence
in the field of human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of participation
of some persons having legal experience." The members need not be lawyers or judges,
even though all have been to date. See DOMINIc McGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLrrICAL RIGHTS 44 (1990).
40 Id. at 47.
4' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at art. 40.
4 Id. at art. 41.
- Id. at art. 5. U.N.Y.B., supra note 13, at 609.
4 WILLIAMS, supra note 37, at 12.
4 McGOLDRICK, supra note 39, at 54.
1996]
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In the cases brought to it by individuals, the Committee has inter-
preted torture, and "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"
to be any treatment that deprives the detainee of his or her basic human
dignity. The Committee has failed, however, to clearly define the mean-
ings of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment and to
distinguish between actions.' Thus, critics have charged that the
Committee's findings are arbitrary.47 The Committee created controversy
when it refrained from using the term "torture" in some cases where the
facts were similar to other cases where the actions were found to amount
to torture. In Lanza v. Uruguay, the victim was constantly blindfolded
and subjected to mistreatment. The Committee found that the "treatment"
of the victim was a violation of the Covenant, without characterizing
under what type of prohibited treatment the actions fell. In a similar case,
the Committee characterized the actions as "severe treatment."'  Yet
another inconsistency emerged in Acosta v. Uruguay, where the Commit-
tee found incommunicado detention (without any other evidence of
mistreatment) to constitute torture within the meaning of Article 7 of the
Covenant.'
In summary, the Committee's view of what constitutes torture
conforms to most lay people's conception of torture, and thus the findings
and comments of the Committee are largely predictable. The legal signifi-
cance of the terms, however, remains largely undefined. This vagueness
can lead to problems in cases involving the lower end of the spectrum of
ill-treatment.
C. Human Rights Standards under a State of Emergency
The state of emergency currently in force in Egypt bears mention of
human rights law under states of emergency. As discussed below, many
of the Egyptian violations of human rights are occurring under the
authority of the emergency laws enacted to silence political opposition."0
The human rights standards developed for nations at war or under a state
of emergency differ slightly from the above standards, in that they allow
for derogations from certain norms due to extraordinary circumstances.
Emergency is defined in the ICCPR as a "public emergency which
threatens the life of a nation."'" Although war is not explicitly men-
46 Id. at 370-71.
4' Id. at 371.
48 Id.
'9 Id. at 370.
o See discussion infra part 1I.A.2.
s' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at art. 4.
[Vol. 28:141
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tioned because a U.N. instrument could not envisage war, war is general-
ly seen as the greatest public emergency." "Life of a nation" is general-
ly interpreted to mean the security and general welfare of the people.53
The instruments discussed above, however, make it clear that the right to
be free from torture is non-derogable, even under a state of emergency.
Article 4 of the ICCPR, which provides for the derogability of certain
rights, exempts Article 7 on the right to be free from torture from the
provision.54 Similarly, Article 2 of the Convention Against Torture states
that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether . . . internal
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture."55 The right to be free from arbitrary detention,
however, is not exempted from derogability.
In studying and explaining the disparity of enforcement of human
rights standards between a Western state and a non-Western state, it is
imperative to understand the human rights standards on detention during
a state of emergency. Many governments justify their violations of the
standards by arguing that certain derogations from the standards are
inevitable to fight the internal threats to the viability of their state and the
security of their people.56 The only derogable standard, however, is the
freedom from arbitrary detention. Freedom from torture, the standard
commonly violated during arbitrary detention, however, is non-derogable.
This juxtaposition raises the question of how a criminal justice system
can insure that this fundamental right of individuals be protected under
the most difficult circumstances such as states of emergency.
PART II: UNIVERSALITY OF THE STANDARDS
As stated in the preamble to the Universal Declaration: "recognition
of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and
peace in the world."57 The preamble evidences the fact that the standards
were developed to protect the most basic right to bodily integrity. The
concept of human rights arose out of a belief by the world's decision-
makers that there existed individual rights common to all peoples which
deserved international protection in order to promote peace and justice in
52 JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
12 (1992).
3 Id. at 13.
5' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at art. 4.
Convention Against Torture art. 2, supra note 25, at 178.
56 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 10 (Egyptian government officials
implying that the internal instability justifies derogation from human rights).
" Universal Declaration, supra note 1, at pmbl.
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the world. The legitimacy of these rights stemmed from their purported
universality.
Political leaders and scholars have attacked the legitimacy of these
international norms by challenging the universality of international human
rights and arguing that human rights violations in non-Western states are
inevitable because these rights are exclusively Western concepts. 8 The
issue of whether international human rights norms were universal despite
their arguably Western formulation and origin monopolized the 1993
United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. 9 The Conference
eventually reached a compromise declaration reaffirming the universality
of the international human rights standards, while recognizing that particu-
lar historical, religious, and cultural backgrounds should be "borne in
mind."' Political leaders of non-Western states challenge the universality
of human rights as a defense when their state is cited for human rights
abuses." Western scholars advocate a culturally-based concept of human
rights in a well-meaning attempt to avoid cultural imperialism and neo-
colonialism; or in other words, to adhere to the currently trendy political
correctness movement. 2 Some Westerners also adopt a cultural relativist
position with respect only to certain human rights, most notably, women's
rights. 3
As evidenced by the available literature on the topic, most of the
human rights debate on the issue of the universality of human rights
focuses on the international norms that can touch upon traditional social
customs (e.g., norms on women's or children's rights as they apply to
domestic laws on female circumcision).64 Human rights law applied to
practices that can be assigned to particular social or religious customs are
more prone to controversial interpretation as a "cultural practice," and
58 Mayer, supra note 4, at 315 (referring to the rejection by Iran's Ambassador to
the U.N. of international human rights prescribed in international instruments as contrary
to Islam); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer
1993, at 22 (arguing that the concept of human rights is exclusively Western).
" Ibrahima Fall, The U-Word: Universality of Human Rights, UNESCO COURIER,
March, 1994, at 9.
o Id. See also Alan Riding, Human Rights: The West Gets Some Tough Questions,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 1993, §4 at 5.
61 Mayer, supra note 4, at 318.
62 See id. at 309, 383 (critiquing Huntington's article, The Clash of Civilizations?);
see generally Huntington, supra note 58.
63 See id. at 393-98 (recounting the denial by Canada of political asylum to a Saudi
Arabian woman who sought refuge from gender discrimination in violation of interna-
tional human rights law).
r Anna Funder, De Minimis Non Curat Lex: The Clitoris, Culture and the Law, 3
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 417 (1993);
[Vol. 28:141
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thus one outside the scope of international human rights law. It is more
difficult for non-Western states, competing for Western aid conditioned in
part, or at least in theory, on democracy-building and a clean human
rights record, to argue that the purely political and civil rights are not
universal. Although the cultural relativists seldom attack criminal proce-
dural rights (e.g., right to be free from arbitrary detention), it is neverthe-
less important to the advocacy for more diligent enforcement of the
human rights law on criminal justice, to analyze and discount the cultural
relativist argument which pervades the international human rights debate.
The cultural relativist position fails in several ways. Most significant
and dangerous is the assumption by relativists that a culture is monolithic.
Their reliance on stereotypes of entire races, ethnicities, and religions
stems from that assumption.65 The result is an argument which must fail
because of its oversimplification. No culture can be viewed as a homoge-
neous grouping of people; nor can religion alone characterize a culture.
Relativists like to refer to the "Islamic culture," thereby obliterating
significant cultural differences which exist among peoples from Morocco
to Indonesia (passing through some sub-Saharan African nations, such as
Nigeria).' These cultural differences, due to the diversity of race, and
ethnicity, as well as historical experience, all give insight into the way
these different states may behave. A simplistic scholarly argument which
conveniently overlooks intricacies and complexities necessarily raises
suspicions and destroys itself.
One of the clear implications of the cultural relativist position is that
standards less protective of individual rights apply to non-Western peo-
ples.67 The cultural relativist argument which justifies violations of
human rights by a non-Western state never advocates that more liberal
rights exist in that non-Westem "culture." The cultural relativist is an
apologist argument, apologizing for the "culture" which makes the viola-
tions inevitable. This implication is at least condescending, and at most
insulting. The implication is central to the Orientalist view of the Middle
East and Muslim world (or the "Orient"). 68 Orientalism is a manifesta-
tion of cultural relativism as applied to an Arab and predominantly
Muslim culture. Orientalism embodies the European colonialist view of
the West as a civilizing force in the colonized world. Orientalist argu-
ments against the universality of international human rights actually mask
65 Mayer, supra note 4, at 381. See also Huntington, supra note 58, at 22.
One well-publicized example is Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations? See
generally Huntington, supra note 58.
67 Funder, supra note 64, at 445.
For a compelling and comprehensive critique of Orientalist scholarship, see
EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
a fear that the "Orientals" will succeed in securing their individual
political rights, thus disturbing the world order so advantageous to the
West.69
Relativists, notably non-Western scholars, argue that some violations
of human rights are due to the fact that non-Western cultures value
collective societal rights over individual rights. The concept of individual
rights originated in Europe, and thus cannot be applied to the non-West-
ern world. Conceding the point that the concept of individual rights as
referred to in international instruments has Western origins, relativists
have nevertheless failed to prove that non-Western cultures do not value
individual rights as well. This argument assumes that the natural law
ideals of Locke can only be referred to in those Western terms used in
international conventions. The fact that some cultures value collective
rights more than the West does not preclude the same cultures valuing
the concepts embodied in the human rights which protect basic human
dignity. When non-Westerners allude to the greater emphasis on group
rights, they are referring to a greater consideration for units such as the
family or the community. 0 They have failed to prove, however, that the
weaker emphasis on individualism in their society would permit a state to
strip an individual of his or her civil rights. Relativists have yet to prove
that the concepts are mutually exclusive.
In stereotyping entire peoples, and assuming a monolithic cultural
thought, relativists fail to account for the dissenters in a society (or as
relativists would characterize it, a culture), who are the intellectuals and
the individuals who claim their human rights have been abused.
Relativists discount the intellectual dissent as Westernized.7 The simplic-
ity of this argument is intellectually dishonest. The entire intellectual
voice of a country cannot be so flippantly ignored and discounted. It is
the perfect argument from the relativists' point of view since the crux of
9 Mayer, supra note 4, at 380.
70 FUNDER, supra note 64, at 446-47. Most recently, the Michael Fay case prompted
apologist commentators to note that Singapore's criminal laws promoted an Asian
society's interest in order through a system which values collective rights over
individual rights. See, e.g., John Hughes, A "Papa Knows Best" Approach to Order in
Singapore, CHRISTIAN SC. MONrrOR, Apr. 21, 1994, at 19.
7' See ALISON DUNDES RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM
VERSUS RELATIVISM 89, 92 (1990). Renteln dismisses non-Western intellectual concep-
tions of human rights which mirror international human rights because they emanate
from the elite, and thus cannot be "authentic" without explaining her rationale. She
states [at 89]: "Consulting jurisprudential and theological texts will surely paint a




their position is that any Western idea is simply inapplicable to the non-
West, so any non-Westerner who espouses ideas determined to be West-
ern can be discounted as Westernized and thus irrelevant to the debate
about his or her own culture. The intellectual elite in the West is regard-
ed as the most eloquent representative of their societies. Relativists have
offered no convincing argument why non-Western elites do not represent
their societies. The only adequate retort to this dismissal of non-Western
elites is to prove that the human rights are universal, and thus the
intellectual dissenters are necessarily only espousing values of their own
culture. At the 1993 U.N. World Conference on Human Rights, the Dalai
Lama, leader of Tibetan Buddhism, stated that it was in "the inherent
nature of all human beings to yearn for freedom, equality, and digni-
ty.
A more peculiar aspect of the relativist position is the minimal
importance it lends to the individual complainants from the non-Western
world who claim their government has violated their human rights. The
relativists fail to address the question of why there are individuals who
complain if the rights allegedly violated are foreign to their cultural con-
cepts. Individuals claim the rights they know are inalienable because they
are human beings, regardless of their culture. These individual complain-
ants cannot be dispensed as Westernized intellectuals. They are perhaps
the most effective argument in support of the position that international
human rights standards speak universally to all peoples."
It has become clear that non-Western regimes are using cultural
relativism as a political shield against negative international public
opinion, as well as domestic dissent stemming from their lack of political
legitimacy. The enthusiastic support which scholars and practitioners,
including non-Western intellectuals, extend to these oppressive regimes is
alarming.
The right to be free from torture and like treatment, and to be free
from arbitrary arrest and detention reach only the most fundamental
interests in our bodily integrity and dignity. The values reflected by these
standards have no cultural or religious boundaries. No culture or religion
would reject these values as contrary to its customs or tenets. Indeed all
religions teach the same fundamental tenets; to refrain from killing, for
example. This tenet evidences the basic value in human life, reflected in
the human rights to freedom from torture and capital punishment.
' Mayer, supra note 4, at 379 (citing Raymond Whitaker, Vienna Gives Dalai
Lama a Hero's Welcome, INDEPENDENT (London), June 16, 1993, at 12, who quoted
the Dalai Lama).
' See FUNDER, supra note 64, at 466.
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The disparity in enforcement of international human rights law on
criminal justice should not and cannot be attributed to the lack of univer-
sality of the international standards. An analysis and comparison of the
legal structures of the criminal justice system of a non-Western state and
a Western state may better explain the disparity in enforcement.
PART 111: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS ENACTED AND ENFORCED IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EGYPT - A COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS
A study of the human rights law discussed above, as enacted in the
national law of the United States and Egypt will show that institutional
factors such as the misallocation of power in the legal system and the
professional training of the system's personnel; as well as a lack of
resources, the under-development of legal civics, and internal threats to
state security might explain the disparity in enforcement of human rights.
The different allocation of power and authority to institutional and non-in-
stitutional actors and structures found in these two legal systems refute
the cultural relativist argument that there are inherent cultural differences
which prevent a non-Western state like Egypt from adhering to interna-
tional human rights standards.
A. Human Rights Standards in Domestic Law
1. United States
a. Human Rights Standards as Enacted in Domestic Law
The U.S. Constitution protects individuals from arbitrary detention
through the Fourth Amendment which states: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause .. ., and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."74 The Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution also protects the individual from pro-
longed pre-trial detention by guaranteeing the accused the right to a
speedy trial.' The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth
Amendment requirement of reasonableness to mean that the judicial de-
termination of probable cause which is required for the issuance of a
warrant extends to the decision to detain a suspect before trial. The
Fourth Amendment thus requires that there be a judicial determination of
probable cause to detain the accused before trial.76 The Fourth Amend-
71 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7' U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
76 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975).
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ment, however, does not require that the judicial determination be in the
form of an adversary proceeding, even though some states might enact
such criminal procedures.' This Supreme Court interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment conforms to Article 9 of the Covenant, which requires
that the domestic law of the state parties provide for a prompt judicial
determination of the lawfulness of arrest and detention."
The Fourth Amendment constitutional requirement is enacted in part
through the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act")79 which sets
the standard for pre-trial detention of persons accused of committing
certain serious felonies. The Act provides additional procedural safeguards
for defendants in pre-trial detention. Reflecting the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Gerstein v. Pugh," the Act requires a judicial determination of
the lawfulness of detention.8 The Act guarantees a suspect inter alia 1)
the right to an attorney at the detention hearing which is held immediate-
ly upon the suspect's first appearance before a judicial officer;82 2) the
right to a lawyer at the detention hearing; 3 and 3) the right to present
witnesses and other evidence. 4 The Act ensures many procedural
protections of civil rights to the suspect which the state and the courts
must surpass before detaining him. The court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant either 1) poses a threat to the
safety of the community; or 2) poses a flight risk. 5 In United States v.
Salerno,86 the Supreme Court held the Act to be constitutional, as con-
forming inter alia to the substantive due process requirement of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, because of the vast procedural safeguards
for the suspects' civil rights provided in the Act, and the legitimate
Congressional intent to protect the public from dangerous suspects (as
opposed to the unacceptable intent to punish suspects before trial).8
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure88 (Federal Rules), which
are binding on federal courts, further embody the constitutional ideals of
criminal procedure law and prescribe the following procedure. At the
' Id. at 123.
"' International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at art. 9.
79 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-142 [hereinafter Bail Reform Act].
o Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 125 (1975).
, Bail Reform Act, supra note 79, § 3142(e).
' Id. § 3142(f).
83 Id.
84 Id.
- Id. § 3142.
86 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
87 Id. at 751-2.
99 FED. R. CRIM. P.
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"booking," when the suspect is first arrested, the suspect is typically
informed of the charge against him and allowed to make at least one
phone call.89 If it is not a minor offense, the suspect will remain at the
police station until he can be presented to a magistrate. During this
detention, the police may conduct a post-arrest investigation, using the
suspect as a source (e.g., putting him in a line-up for identification by
witnesses), and questioning the suspect. During detention, the police
reviews its decision to charge the suspect. The police can decide not to
press charges. Otherwise, the police hand the case over to the prosecutor,
who can either decide not to charge or continue to investigate by direct-
ing the officers who perform the actual investigation. Under Rule 5 of the
Federal Rules, the police must present the suspect to a magistrate "with-
out unnecessary delay" after arrest." This standard is determined by the
circumstances of each case, but is generally held to be a maximum of
forty-eight hours.9 The first appearance usually occurs within a few
hours after arrest.9"
Upon arrest, the suspect must be informed of his rights to remain
silent and to legal counsel. The Supreme Court held in Miranda v.
Arizona93 that the Fifth Amendment required the use of procedural
safeguards to protect the suspect from self-incrimination. Thus, before
beginning an interrogation of a suspect, the police must inform the
suspect of his right to remain silent, that any statement may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to legal counsel, either re-
tained or court-appointed.94 These safeguards are now commonly known
as the "Miranda warnings." The police may not question a suspect who
indicates that he does not wish to be interrogated.95 Evidence obtained
in violation of these rights is inadmissible at trial."
If the suspect does not have counsel, the magistrate must determine
whether he is indigent and then appoint counsel to him at the time of the
'9 YALE KAIMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 22 (8th ed. 1990) [here-
inafter KAMISARI.
90 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
"' Id. at Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, Note to Subdivision (a); KAMISAR,
supra note 89, at 26.
9 KAMISAR, supra note 89, at 26.
9' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
94 Id. at 443-44.
9' Id. at 444.
' Id. at 443. The Miranda rule applies only when the defendant is in custody at
the time of the interrogation. This rule thus raises several other issues such as what
constitutes a "custodial interrogation." See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478




first appearance. Attorneys are provided to indigent defendants by 1) a
state or county public defender service; 2) private attorneys, either
selected by the judge from a list of available attorneys on an ad hoc ba-
sis, or by an administrator on the basis of guidelines; or 3) a law firm or
non-profit organization (e.g., local bar association) who contracts with the
state to provide representation to indigents.97
The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, implementing the Constitutional Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial, also limits the duration of pre-trial
detention by imposing time limits within which a criminal trial must
begin after the filing of charges.98
U.S. criminal procedure law incorporates the more objective institu-
tion of the judiciary in the criminal procedure process at the earliest
possible stage in an attempt to avoid unchecked abuses of police or
prosecutorial discretion. On the other hand, as will be shown below,
Egyptian criminal procedure fails to provide such a procedural safeguard.
As a result, the Egyptian criminal justice process is prone to unchecked
police and prosecutorial abuse of the law.99 This type of structural differ-
ence in systems might explain the disparity in enforcement practices of
international criminal procedure standards.
b. Human Rights Standards as Enforced in the Domestic Legal System
Although human rights organizations focus their attacks on the
United States on capital punishment, particularly with respect to minors
and mentally incompetent defendants," ° there have been documented
cases of violations in the pre-trial detention stages of the criminal justice
process.'' Following are only two examples of such cases:
1. In 1990, Amnesty International reported on several cases of systemat-
ic torture and otherwise ill-treatment of suspects in the Area 2 police
station in Chicago, Illinois between 1972 and 1984. The allegations
arose as a result of the lawsuit brought by one of the victims, Andrew
Wilson, in 1989 for civil rights violations. Wilson was detained in 1982
on suspicion of murdering two Chicago police officers. During interroga-
tion, he was beaten and kicked, was nearly suffocated by a plastic bag
9 KAMISAR, supra note 89, at 27.
91 THE SPEEDY TRIAL Acr OF 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161.
9 See discussion infra part llI.A.2.
'o Quigley, supra note 15, at 74 n.107 (quoting Letter of Carole Nagengast, Chair,
Board of Directors, Amnesty International U.S.A. to Hon. Claibome Pell, Chairman,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, Mar. 27, 1992).
... Miranda and subsequent cases are further evidence of the practice of police coer-
cion of criminal suspects. See discussion supra Part I.A.l.a and note 96.
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placed over his head, had a gun placed in his mouth, and was subjected
to electric shock torture. The medical director of the hospital serving the
Cook County jail inmates urged an investigation after examining Wilson.
An investigation by the Chicago Police Department recommended that
the complaint be dismissed as "not sustained."'" The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, found enough evidence to overturn Wilson's conviction
on the ground that his confession made in police custody may have
been coerced. 3 In Wilson's civil rights suit against the police depart-
ment, the jury found a de facto policy to ill-treat suspects of police offi-
cer killings. Wilson located more than twenty other suspects who alleged
torture, and found that at least twelve of those filed complaints with the
Chicago Police Department who dismissed every one of the complaints
as "not sustained."'I 4
2. The ethics scholar, Monroe Freedman, recently wrote about the case
of Robert H., a defendant who spent six months in jail in Atlanta,
without any formal charges being filed against him and without seeing
either a judge or a lawyer.0  Under the threat of another year in jail
if he did not confess, Robert H. pled guilty and was freed. He was in
fact innocent of the drug offense. As Freedman writes, "The Hawkins
case is ...not unique. The administration of criminal justice in Atlanta
and New York City would shame some of the despotic regimes that are
regularly criticized in the State Department's human rights reports."'"
In the case of the violation of the human rights standard on arbitrary
detention which occurred in Atlanta,0 7 the suspect was detained in
violation of domestic0 8 and international law"° as a result of a break-
down in the normal criminal procedure process. Following his arrest,
there was no appearance before a judicial officer, which led to the
suspect being detained for six months without charges being filed against
him. This prolonged detention without judicial intervention was a vio-
lation of Articles 9 and 14 of the ICCPR" ° and the Fourth Amendment
"' AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, U.S.A., ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE TORTURE IN
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 1 (1990).
03 People v. Wilson, 506 N.E.2d 571, 576 (Ill. 1987).
'04 AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 102, at 1-2.
"0S Monroe Freedman, Third World Justice First World Shame, TEXAS LAWYER,




See generally supra part I.A.
"o International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at arts. 9 &
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of the U.S. Constitution."' This situation mirrors the cases of violations
which occurred in Egypt, highlighted below."' The requirement of
promptly presenting a suspect to a court for a detention hearing introduc-
es an independent and objective institution in the process precisely to
avoid such abuses of police and prosecutorial power. The episode il-
lustrates how an independent judiciary which plays an early role in the
criminal procedure process is indispensable to protecting the rights of the
suspect. In this case, the police and prosecution obviously abused their
power and discretion to their fullest extent, unchecked by any other
institution. Thus in Egypt, where the Code of Criminal Procedure allows
a much longer detention without the mandatory appearance of the suspect
before a court, the more rampant abuses which occur during detention can
be expected.
2. Egypt
a. Human Rights Standards as Enacted in Domestic Law
Article 71 of the Constitution of Egypt guarantees the right of a
suspect to be free from arbitrary arrest and detention."3 The suspect has
the right to be informed promptly of the charges against him, as well as
the right to communicate with "anyone as prescribed in the law", and to
be brought to trial as soon as possible."4 Article 67 of the Egyptian
Constitution states that every person accused of a crime must be provided
with counsel for his defense." 5 Article 42 prohibits "moral or physical
harm""6 from being inflicted upon any person arrested or detained.
Article 42 further mandates that "Any person arrested [or] detained...
shall be treated in the manner concomitant with the preservation of his
dignity.''. Although the word "torture" is not used, torture clearly falls
within the prohibition of "physical harm" and would violate a person's
"dignity." The Constitution further protects individuals from torture by
providing that:
Any assault on individual freedom or on the inviolability of private
14.
' See discussion supra part M.A.l.a.
"2 See infra part Il.A.2.b.
"I EGYPT CONST. art 71, in CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIS OF THE WORLD
(1991).
114 Id.
I Id. at art. 67.
116 Id. at art. 42.
117 Id.
15919961
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life ... and any other public rights and liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution and the law shall be considered a crime, whose criminal
and civil lawsuit is not liable to prescription. The State shall grant a fair
compensation to the victim of such an assault."8
The Code of Criminal Procedure"9 implements those constitutional
rights as follows:
The police can hold a person suspected of committing a felony for
up to twenty-four hours before presenting the case to a public prosecutor
who then takes over the investigation.20 Unlike the U.S. prosecutor, the
Egyptian public prosecutor is a judicial officer with a neutral role. The
public prosecutor investigates the crime as a neutral investigator and
represents the community interest. 2 ' The public prosecutor then has four
days to investigate and prepare the case. The prosecutor can have a series
of extensions which can last up to ninety-six days. 22 The suspect can
thus be detained legally up to ninety-six days without seeing a judge. The
suspect has the right to an attorney immediately upon arrest,"2 but is
reportedly never informed of his right to an attorney.'24 He is similarly
rarely informed of his right to remain silent."z Persons suspected of
committing misdemeanors can be detained only if the alleged offense is
punishable by a minimum of three months imprisonment. Those persons
have no right to counsel.2 6
The political instability in Egypt has significantly altered the criminal
procedure outlined above. Egypt has been under some type of state of
exception since 1967, except between May, 1980 and October, 1981.
Under the Nasser regime, arbitrary detention and torture were systemati-
cally used against the political opposition, particularly Communists and
members of the Muslim Brotherhood party during the 1950s and
1960s.27 During his first few years in power in the early 1970s, Sadat
introduced liberalization measures and released the Muslim Brotherhood
18 Id. at art. 57.
... CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE [C. CRIM. PROC.] (Egypt).
'20 Id. at art 36.
212 Confidential source (on file with author).
122 CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] arts. 201-203 (Fr.).
123 Id. at art. 141; EGYPT CONST. art. 67, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD (1991).
121 Confidential source (on file with author).
125 Id.
126 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 119, at art. 141.
12' KIRK J. BEATTIE, EGYPT DURING THE NASSER YEARS: IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND
CIvIL SOCIETY 129-30 (1994).
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members whom Nasser had jailed.'28 Although some observers maintain
that torture rarely occurred during the 1970s,2 9 Sadat nevertheless ruled
Egypt under state of emergency measures for all but seventeen months of
his presidency.' Like Nasser, Sadat used arbitrary arrest and detention
to shield his regime and policies from effective opposition.' At the end
of his presidency, Sadat responded to popular uprisings against his regime
with repressive measures, such as mass arrests, increased press censorship,
and the enactment of the most repressive emergency measure in January,
1977.132 Further political oppression followed President Sadat's assassi-
nation by Muslim fundamentalist activists, in 1981.2"3
The Emergency Law, which was declared in October 1981 after
President Sadat's assassination, has been in place continuously since then
and was most recently renewed for a three-year term in April 1994 (the
Law).'34 It has significantly altered the criminal procedure law for per-
sons suspected of activities against the public order and security. The
Law targets members of political groups advocating an Islamic Egyptian
state.'35 The Emergency Law allows the soldiers and officers of the
General Directorate for State Security Investigation (SSI), an arm of the
Ministry of Interior, to arrest persons they suspect of carrying on activi-
ties against the public order, and detain them for up to four months.'36
Most significantly, the Law allows for administrative as well as incommu-
nicado detention, and also allows for civilians to be tried in military
courts. 37
'2 DEREK HoPwOOD, EGYPT: POLITCs AND SOcIETY 1945-90 112, 117 (1991).
'1 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 6.
130 RAYMOND WILLIAM BAKER, SADAT AND AFTER: STRUGGLES FOR EGYPT'S
POLmCAL SOUL 60 (1990).
131 Id.
.3. Id. The law "allowed a sentence of life imprisonment with hard labor for
membership in a clandestine and armed organization hostile to the state, for participa-
tion in a damaging strike, or for planning or taking part in a demonstration that
endangered public security." Id. at 60-61.
133 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 6.
'3 Three More Years for Emergency Law, MONEYCLIPS, Apr. 14, 1994, available in
LEXIS, World Library, MOCLIP File.
135 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 10-11.
'm Egyptian Decrees on Security Measures, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Oct. 15, 1981, available in LEXIS, World Library, BBCSWB File.
137 Id.
19961
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b. Human Rights Standards as Enforced in the Domestic Legal System
The international community has increasingly attacked Egypt for
gross human rights violations despite the fact that Egypt's Constitution
and Code of Criminal Procedure conform to the human rights standards
set out in the instruments discussed above. There is considerable and
reliable evidence that Egypt is not fulfilling its international obligations in
practice. The violations are occurring mostly in cases of persons arrested
and detained under the Emergency Law.
The following are a few illustrative cases of documented torture. The
claims of torture are supported by the courts' judgments to exclude the
defendants' confessions as evidence because they were obtained under
torture or other coercion, and the courts' awards of compensation for
victims or their relatives. The courts apparently found that torture oc-
curred and redress was warranted despite the perpetrators never being
identified.
1. Basil Abd al-Muhsin Hammouda was arrested on September 26, 1985
when he was tracing the whereabouts of his father who had been arrest-
ed on political grounds. He was held in Qasr al-Nil police station in
Cairo where he was tortured. '38 He died three years later allegedly as
a result of psychological effects of the torture he suffered. His father
was awarded compensation by a court in 1989.'
2. Hana Ali Farrag was a seventeen-year-old student when she was
arrested in Minya in July, 1990. She recounted her experience to Am-
nesty International:
They took me to the police station .... Three of them asked me
where my brother was hiding. . . . I kept telling them I didn't
know where he was.... I was swinging upside down from a bar
under my knees and they hit the soles of my feet with a thick
wooden stick, and kept repeating the same questions. My broth-
er ... was not wanted in connection with any offense, it was just
the usual detention.14°
3. Dr. Mohammad Mandour, Head of Psychiatry at the Palestine Red
Crescent Hospital in Cairo and a board member of the Egyptian Organi-
zation of Human Rights was arrested in 1991. They held him at the SSI
Directorate in Lazoghly Square [Cairo]. He was told he was being held
338 The Amnesty Report does not specify the type of torture.
13' TEN YEARS OF TORTURE, supra note 5, at 4.
"0 Id. at 5.
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in administrative detention and that there was no charge against him. He
was blindfolded and handcuffed with his hands in front of him for
thirteen days. The handcuffs tightened with every movement, and
consequently caused a partial loss of sensation in his thumb and left
hand. He had no change of clothes during this time, and had access to
water for ten days, but no soap. They applied electric shocks to sensi-
tive parts of his body, and suspended him from his wrists with his feet
still touching the ground for one day. They also struck him repeated-
ly.1
41
Political detainees who are charged and who claim to have been
tortured may be examined by a forensic medical doctor from the Ministry
of Justice at the request of the state prosecutor or the trial court. On the
other hand, administrative detainees held without being charged or tried
usually have no opportunity to submit a complaint about their treatment
to the competent authorities. Many of the medical exams lose some of
their usefulness because they are conducted long after the torture oc-
curred, when the physical evidence of torture may have disappeared or
faded. The state's doctors nevertheless have confirmed many incidents of
torture in their examination reports. 42
The Egyptian government's response has been a denial of all accusa-
tions, and the assertion that investigations of allegations of torture resulted
in no finding of evidence of torture. 43 The government also argues that
human rights are observed in Egypt as evidenced by the Constitution and
the Code of Criminal Procedure.'"
Similar to the U.S. incidents of abuses, the Egyptian incidents of
violations suggest that prosecutorial authority should be checked by
another branch of the state to prevent prosecutorial abuses of power. The
international instruments, as well as the Egyptian Constitution and Code
of Criminal Procedure, recognize that a suspect must be brought before
a neutral judiciary to protect the suspect from likely abuses of power
from the enforcement and investigatory branches of the legal system.
These latter branches focus on law enforcement, and as such have differ-
ent interests than the judiciary. The judiciary's interest in the legal system
is the application of law. The application of law requires the judiciary to
balance the competing interests of law enforcement and individual liberty.
The law recognizes that these competing interests must be represented
equally in a criminal proceeding in order to achieve justice. Prolonged
14' Id. at 8.
142 Id. at 9-10.
143 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 116-17.
1" Id.
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detention by the police with the approval of the prosecutor, but without
the intervention of a judicial officer eliminates an indispensable check on
enforcement power. During their incommunicado detention, which violated
Article 71 of the Egyptian Constitution,45 and Articles 9 and 14 of the
ICCPR,' 4 the above three Egyptians were tortured, in violation of Arti-
cle 41 of the Egyptian Constitution 47 and Article 7 of the ICCPR. "
The outcome of a failure in the process is predictable, as is shown by the
same outcome from the same breakdown in procedure in both the United
States and Egypt.'49
One of the basic causes of the violations of human rights during
preventive detention is a failure in the institutional allocation of power
within the system. An explicit comparison of the U.S. and Egyptian
systems will reveal further causes, such as a difference in the training and
role of institutional and non-institutional actors. The comparison thus also
leads to an evaluation of reform proposals which would minimize failures
in the systems which cause human rights abuses.
B. Comparison of Legal Systems
1. Institutional Structures of Legal Systems
A structural and functional comparison of the American and Egyptian
systems will explain in part the disparity in each state's domestic enforce-
ment of international human rights law. The comparison of the domestic
law in each country highlights the fact that Egyptian criminal procedure
law conforms in great part to the international human rights instruments
which are binding on Egypt. Therefore, the solution to Egypt's egregious
violations of international human rights lies not in a reform of its law,
but in a reform of the structure of its legal system which would promote
greater enforcement of existing Egyptian law, and thus further the integri-
ty of the Egyptian legal system, as designed by the Egyptian Constitution.
The structural and functional comparison will focus on the following
interrelated questions: 1) in what institution does which authority lie?; and
2) what are the functions of the personnel in the system?
145 EGYPT CONST. art. 71, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(1991).
"4 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, arts. 9 &
14.
" EGYPT CONST. art. 41, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(1991).
14" International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 13, at art. 7.




At the federal level, the U.S. criminal justice system is separated into
three functions which are each allocated to a separate branch of the state.
The enforcement function belongs to the executive branch, through the
Attorney-General and the Department of Justice. The courts, or judiciary
branch, hold the responsibility of applying the law. Although the federal
judges are nominated by the executive, their independence and objectivity
is ensured in large part by their life appointment, as well as their confir-
mation by the legislative branch, the Senate. The law enforcement author-
ities, which include mostly the police and the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (FBI) at the federal level, 5 perform the investigatory function of
the criminal prosecution process. The local police perform the preliminary
stage of the investigation which leads to arrest, at its own discretion.
Once the prosecutor decides to prosecute, the police continues the investi-
gation at the direction of the prosecutor's office. The wide scope of the
police function (most significantly, the police alone can elect to arrest
someone and detain that person for up to forty-eight hours before a
neutral judicial determination must be made of the legality of the arrest
or detention) is checked by the independent judiciary.
Although the American prosecutor has arguably the most authority of
prosecutors in any other system,' there are less instances of unchecked
prosecutorial abuse of discretion than would be expected given human
nature, and the experiences of other systems. When prosecutors abuse
their enforcement discretion which lead to violations of civil rights, the
courts exercise their independent function of review of prosecutorial
discretion.
b. Egypt
In Egypt, the Ministry of Justice, a member of the executive branch,
oversees the judiciary (the courts) as well as the prosecutorial arm of the
justice system, the niyaba. The authority to enforce and apply the law,
therefore, lies with the executive branch. There is a concentration of
power and authority in the legal system.'52 This concentration of power
ISO ther specialized law enforcement bodies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency
or the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms will not be discussed.
S' Jay A. Sigler, The Prosecutor: A Comparative Functional Analysis, in THE
PROSECUTOR 55 (William F. McDonald ed., 1979).
"' See Mahmoud M. Mustafa, Les Rapports entre l'Organisation Judiciaire et la
Procedure Penale en Egypte [The Relationship Between the Judicial Organization and
Penal Procedure in Egypt], REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr PENAL 751-52 (1988).
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raises the issue of whether there are institutional checks on abuses of
power which are adequate to protect the defendants' rights, as well as
serve the public's (or justice's) rights.
The experience of Egypt shows that any institutional checks are
inadequate, and the state of emergency procedure further supports this
observation. The Egyptian judiciary and the prosecutorial branch are now
unable to function independently of the executive,1 53 as the President
and the Ministry of Interior appear to exert overwhelming power over the
office of the Prosecutor General as well as the courts.'54 Thus, the prac-
tical operation of the Egyptian legal system is inconsistent with the
system envisaged by the Constitution which states clearly in Article 65:
"The independence and immunity of the judiciary are two basic guaran-
tees to safeguard rights and liberties." '55
There are ties between the niyaba and the SSI which compromise the
independence of the prosecutorial branch. Increasing numbers of SSI
officers become prosecutors after completing the Police College which
grants them a law degree. Therefore, many prosecutors are charged with
investigating the alleged violations of former colleagues. 56 The Prosecu-
tor General cannot be entirely independent as envisaged by the Constitu-
tion since he is appointed by the President. That fact alone cannot
account for the lack of the prosecutorial independence since many sys-
tems of the world, such as the United States, charge the executive with
selecting the head of the prosecutorial branch. The prosecutorial branch
is necessarily an arm of the executive branch, and thus is subordinate to
it, since its purpose is to carry out the executive's function of enforcing
the law. In contrast to the U.S. Attorney General, who is expected to act
independently,'57 in Egypt, observers such as one former "high-rank-
ing"'58 officer in the Ministry of Interior state that: "The Prosecutor
General must be submissive. If he doesn't walk in harmony with SSI, he
will lose favor."' 59 To further compromise the independence of the
prosecutorial branch, the current Prosecutor General is part of the state
"' See EGYPT CONST. art. 65, in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD
(1991) (requiring the independence and immunity of the judiciary).
', See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 138.
155 EGYPT CONST., supra note 113, at art. 65.
156 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 26, at 138.
157 One structural characteristic that, in effect, requires the Attorney-General to act
independently of the executive branch is the law that enables the Attorney-General to
appoint an independent counsel to investigate executive branch violations of the law. 28
U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1994).
,5' HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 138.
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security prosecutor's office."W Human Rights Watch, after conducting an
extensive investigation of human rights abuses in Egypt, concluded that
"[tihe problem of the lack of independence permeates the prosecutor's of-
fice".'6' One Egyptian human rights monitor told Human Rights Watch:
"[t]here is no tradition that a niyaba looks at himself as separate from the
executive branch. The niyaba does not recognize himself as truly indepen-
dent and he does not make trouble. If he makes trouble, he doesn't get
ahead." 62 One Egyptian journalist confirmed this opinion in an inter-
view with Human Rights Watch: "Prosecutors have a deep relationship
with the government. This is a possible defect."'63 The structure of the
legal system thus permits the executive to exercise control over all three
functions in the administration of justice (investigation, enforcement, and
application) because they are concentrated in one executive institution, the
Ministry of Justice."6 Most significant is the executive's unchecked
power over the prosecutorial branch of the system.'
The structure of the system also makes the independence and objec-
tivity of the judiciary difficult as most judges were previously niyaba,
despite a law requiring that at least twenty-five percent of judges emanate
from the private sector.' It follows that judges are thus often adjudicat-
ing cases presented by their former colleagues. This situation can lead to
favoritism instead of neutrality, as well as corruption in the extreme
cases. The lack of investigation of allegations of torture and the nearly
perfect conviction rate of political defendants support these assertions. 67
Although the courts have repeatedly ordered the release of persons held
arbitrarily by the SSI, have awarded compensation to victims of torture,
and have excluded as evidence confessions proven to have been obtained
under torture; another branch of the executive, (the Ministry of Interior
and its police arm, the SSI,) has deceived the courts by detaining suspects
incommunicado, and by falsifying records. Human Rights Watch has dis-
covered evidence of numerous persons detained at police stations or SSI
offices without any record of their stay.'68 The SSI also routinely moves
detainees from one location to another to maintain the incommunicado de-




"m Mustafa, supra note 152, at 762-63.
' Id.
" Confidential source (on file with author).
167 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 27, at 133.
'6 See id. at eh. 2.
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tention. When records are kept, dates are apparently falsified. 69 The
Egyptian legal system is thus being compromised from within, by the
institution designed to maintain its integrity, the executive branch.
2. Actors in Legal Systems
a. Institutional Actors
There are non-quantifiable variables which also affect the enforce-
ment of human rights, such as the personnel in the legal system. Analyz-
ing the institutional structure of a legal system clouds one of the key
factors in a legal system's success: the people who fill the ranks of the
system's institutions. Evaluating the personnel of a legal system on an
empirical basis is difficult. In the review of a legal system, however, the
evaluation of the personnel who perform the functions of the system is
indispensable. As shown above, the personnel regularly violate the law
and abuse the rights of suspects. Although structural reform can resolve
some of the abuses by checking or eliminating the power and discretion
of certain personnel, there are other factors which affect the personnel
and which account for abuses, such as professional training and commit-
ment of the personnel.
Fewer abuses by American personnel may be attributed to the
increased emphasis of professionalism and ethics training in the U.S. The
personnel filling the ranks of the criminal justice system have received
professional ethics education, and are bound by a code of professional
conduct. 7 ' Arguably, such lawyers and judges will be less corruptible
and more committed to upholding the ideals of the law than their Egyp-
tian homologues who lack that specialized education and training.
The lack of sources on professionalism training of Egyptian lawyers
leads to the conclusion that legal education and professional training in
Egypt might be less focused on ethics and professionalism. This differ-
ence in training is undoubtedly due in part to the vast difference in
financial resources available to the U.S. and Egyptian governments as
well as their respective bar associations.
The limited resources of which the Egyptian state and the bar,
however, cannot excuse all insufficiencies of the system. The U.S.
experience of human rights violations due to failures in its system points
to the fact that greater resources do not solve all problems. The resources
must be allocated and expended efficiently. Targeting specific areas where
169 Id. at 65-66.




failures in procedural safeguards occur most often would be an efficient
use of resources. This Note attempts to identify plausible areas in need of
reform or development. Human rights advocates and the international
community should study these areas in attempting to find solutions to
human rights violations in the United States and Egypt.
b. Non-Institutional Actors
If there are inadequate institutional checks on abuses of power, non-
institutional actors may counter those weaknesses in the system. The
public, as an informed and educated actor, may play that role. In addition
to the state or the bar, the media can also play a role in the system by
acting as a mass educator on the legal system. The American public and
media fulfill these roles.'" An informed public plays a significant role
in the American system in checking abuses of power by the police, the
prosecution or the courts. As a result of public legal education, the
American suspect may be more likely to demand that the police read him
or her the mandatory "Miranda rights," or be less likely to volunteer
information during an interrogation without counsel present. Although in-
creased public legal education leads to an over-litigious society (such as
the United States), public awareness of legal rights also translates into a
more just criminal justice system for the American public by providing an
additional check on police and prosecutorial discretion.
Although it is difficult to assess the extent of the legal education of
the Egyptian public from the available source material, the information
gathered implies that the Egyptian legal institutions have not focused on
public legal education. Just as there might be less focus on ethics training
for lawyers, there might be less focus on launching a mass public educa-
tion campaign.'72 Again, this difference in focus is due in part to a lack
of resources. Thus, in an attempt to improve the criminal justice system
in Egypt, this area is also worthy of targeted resources.
171 In recent years, Courtroom Television (Court T.V.) and Cable News Network
(CNN) have contributed to the legal education of the U.S. public. See, e.g., Steven
Brill, Reality Television: An Antidote to the Media Circus, LEGAL TIIMEs, July 25,
1994, at 20.
" This is in contrast to the U.S. experience, where the American Bar Association
organizes public legal education campaigns. See, e.g., C. Thomas Ross, Two Bicentenni-
als: Making the 1980s a Decade of Constitutional Literacy, 68 A.B.A. J. 434 (April,
1982) (reporting on a major ABA-funded campaign to educate the American public
about the Bill of Rights).
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3. Internal Threat to Security of State
The serious threat to the viability of the Egyptian state which the
ongoing fight between government forces and opposition Muslim funda-
mentalist groups pose has obviously compromised the legal system's
theoretical structure and foundations, as organized in Egyptian law. The
threat facing Egypt is currently particular to many developing states,
especially in predominantly Muslim states facing a rise in political Islamic
movements, 73 but not to any Western state. Freedom from torture, as a
non-derogable right under international law, cannot be justified or
contextualized. Freedom from arbitrary, incommunicado, and administra-
tive detentions, however, are not mentioned in human rights instruments
as non-derogable rights under a state of emergency. The problem cannot
be ignored when reviewing a country's human rights practices. Therefore,
recommendations and solutions must include proposals to help the violat-
ing state with its real public security problems, without compromising
individual rights. This necessary inclusion implies that human rights
advocates should reevaluate their blanket policy of demanding cuts in
Western aid to states guilty of violating human rights standards, and
advocating international isolation of those countries."
CONCLUSION: PROPOSALS FOR INCREASED ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS
Closing the gap between the text of the law and the application of
that same law requires increased enforcement of the existing law, as well
as a partial reform of the law. As shown above, systemic misapplication
of the law suggests that the institutional structure of the system may need
change. The cases of violations of human rights analyzed above reflect
the fact that unchecked abuse of police and prosecutorial discretion
173 In addition to Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey (to name
only a few) are all facing varying degrees of armed political opposition based on
Islamic ideologies. John Murray Brown, A Debut of Fire for Turkey's Premier: First
Woman PM Names Cabinet Amid Troubles at Home and Abroad, FIN. TIMES, July 6,
1993, at 3; Mark Nicholson, Tunisia Refines Battle Against Fundamentalists: The
Government Continues its Assault on Islam Despite Rising Economic Pressures, FIN.
TIMEs, June 2, 1993, at 6; The Maghreb: How to Ride Islam's Tiger, ECONOMIST, July
8, 1989, at 48.
"' Most recently, the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch campaigned
against the granting of Most Favored Nation status to China. See Hobart Rowen, Too
Cozy With China's Despots, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1994, at A31; Simon Beck,




account for the violations. Reform of Egyptian criminal procedure should
focus on promoting and maintaining the independence and neutrality of
the judiciary, and increasing the institutional checks on police and prose-
cutorial discretion. Human rights advocates should also focus on the areas
mentioned above, such as 1) increased resources for professional training,
2) development of public legal education programs, and 3) Western
economic aid targeted at alleviating the economic problems which ulti-
mately cause the social instability in Egypt and other countries similarly
situated.
The problem on which scholars studying the Egyptian criminal
justice system have focused is the unification of all functions of the
criminal justice system in one institution, the Ministry of Justice.75 The
key structural reform to evaluate is the separation of functions, notably to
reserve the function of applying the law to a neutral and independent
judiciary, without interference from other branches.
The first reform of the Egyptian system should be to enforce the
existing laws which are aimed at maintaining the independence and
objectivity of the courts. One such law mandates that twenty-five percent
of the judges come from outside the ranks of the prosecutorial branch,
but is not enforced at all. 76 As demonstrated above, an independent
judiciary is key to the integrity of a criminal justice system. The lack of
enforcement of this specific law might be linked to the perceived lack of
professional training of lawyers in the private sector. This problem il-
lustrates the thesis that a lack of resources is a factor which can explain
the disparity in the enforcement of human rights norms. Effective struc-
tural reform should, therefore, be linked to a targeting of increased
resources.
To increase the independence of the prosecutor general's office from
the executive, as well as the internal security forces, substantive legal
reform should include a prohibition against appointing a prosecutor
general with ties to the Ministry of Interior security forces or military
branch. To further separate the enforcement branch from the military and
internal security branches, SSI officers should not be conferred a law
degree from the Police College. Lawyers should all receive the same
education to ensure the same training and most importantly, the same
emphasis on which principles the legal system is designed to protect. The
Police College must emphasize the law enforcement aspect and the
interests of the public, whereas universities must emphasize the interests
of the suspects and defendants, thus providing a more balanced approach
" See Mustafa, supra note 152, at 751.
,76 Confidential source (on file with author).
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to the law.
The human rights debate on widespread abuses is more focused on
redefining the rights protected in order to accommodate violating states,
than on analyzing why the violations occur despite the violating states
fulfilling their international obligations in their domestic law. An analysis
of the systems in which more of the violations occur show that violations
may be decreased by certain structural and procedural changes in the
legal systems, rather than by redefining the international standards.
Although it is easier to resolve the problem of human rights viola-
tions facing the international community by resorting to a cultural
relativist analysis, this solution undermines and dilutes the international
norms of human rights designed to protect our most fundamental right to
human dignity. This focus on cultural explanation and perceived cultural
differences in values, mostly advocated by Westerners, ultimately only
quells the cries for help to the United Nations and Western governments
from those individuals countries whose rights have been abused. The
international community should heed the voices of dissenters whose rights
have been egregiously violated and demand greater enforcement of
international human rights norms from the violating states. This response
would reflect the ideal of international human rights law, whereas the
current trend to accommodate the political interests of the violating
regimes completely undermines the authority of human rights law.
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